Gendering global governance by Rai, Shirin
  
University of Warwick institutional repository  
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s: Shirin Rai 
Article Title:  Gendering Global Governance 
Year of publication: 2004 
Link to published version: 
http://dxd.doi.org/10.1080/1461674042000283345 
Publisher statement: None 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Gendering Global Governance1
Shirin M. Rai 
  
University of Warwick 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In this article, I examine the concept of global governance2. Both global and 
governance are contested and important concepts. The first indicates the scope and 
scale of today’s world of production, consumption and exchange and the other 
encapsulates the shift from ‘state/government’ to ‘multi-layered’ governance not only 
of states and markets but also of interstate relations and security. I argue that the shift 
from government to governance is a response to the needs of a gendered global 
capitalist economy and is shaped by struggles, both discursive and material, against 
the unfolding consequences of globalisation3
  
. In making my case I begin by 
reviewing three key areas in the global governance debate. These are the place of 
globalised markets and new regulatory regimes, the place of the state within the 
global political economy and the challenges it faces, and the processes of 
democratisation that can be seen as a bridge between shifts in state/market relations 
and the emerging governance framework. I argue that mainstream global governance 
debates would gain much from the insights that feminists have developed on key 
issues of knowledge, reasoning and epistemic communities, on the economic and 
social consequences of disciplinary neoliberalism and on the politics of engagement 
with institutions of power.  I also suggest that this shift from government poses 
challenges for feminist political practice. These challenges are both of scholarship and 
of activism as feminists struggle to address the possibilities and politics of alternatives 
to the current regimes of governance.   
   
Ideologies of Global Governance 
 
Governance emerges as a concept in the post-Cold War and some would call it 
a ‘post-statist’ period of the 1980s. We can easily pick up the threads of liberal 
triumphalism in the discourse of convergence that was articulated at this time (see for 
example, Fukayama,1991; Huntington,1995 and Barber, 1996). In post-cold war 
sketches of the world system in late twentieth century, liberal values triumph over 
others; aspects of western civilisation over other cultures; and modernity’s concerns 
are resolved through these triumphs. Struggles within the parameters of other cultures, 
religions, and ideologies, upon this envisioning, are doomed to failure unless they 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Upendra Baxi, Catherine Hoskyns and Georgina Waylen and two anonymous referees 
for thoughtful and critical comments from which I have learnt a great deal. The shortcomings are, of 
course, all mine.  
2 I see governance as a gendered system of rules and mechanisms that translate these rules for ‘public 
life’ bounded by and constitutive of discursive, political and economic power. Governance includes 
multiple actors as well as multiple sites, thus taking away the state-centric approach to rule-making and 
implementation. 
3 I define globalisation as the process by which capitalism has become global. Capitalism is not simply, 
upon this reading, an economic framework, but fundamentally a set of gendered social relations, which 
is reflected in and structures the way we produce and exchange goods and services as well ideas and 
ideologies.  
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recognise the impossibility of reform from within. The logical conclusion then is that 
a liberal world is the only future that we can ‘rationally’ look forward to if we wish to 
live civilised, non-violent and democratic lives. The ‘clash of civilisations’ scenario 
takes on tremendous force in the context of the September 11 attacks upon the World 
Trade Centre, and the idea of governance faces its first major challenge. The ‘war on 
terror’ has become a part of the governance discourse – Afghanistan and Iraq both 
become examples of an active engagement with the politics of convergence. Non-
liberal regimes, especially those that defy rather than work with western ‘civilisation’ 
become legitimate targets of attack and reconfiguration4. This western civilisation is 
also a ‘market civilisation’ (Gill,1995:399) where the individual competes for 
resources in the market and where the market civilisation “tends to generate a 
perspective on the world that is ahistorical, economistic, materialistic, ‘me-oriented’ 
short-termist, and ecologically myopic.” (ibid.)5
 
.  
Four different strands thus become visible when we examine the context in 
which ‘governance’ emerged as a discourse. First, was the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the beginning of the post-Cold War period in the international system. 
Second, and building on this, was the convergence of economic policies under 
globalisation within the neo-liberal framework which, arguably, are being embedded 
through mechanisms of global governance. Third, as a consequence of the collapse of 
‘communism’ and the rise and dominance of the neo-liberal framework in the global 
economy, was a re-examination of the role of the state in the context of the post-Cold 
War globalisation. And finally, was the emergence of the discourse of 
democratisation as the most appropriate framework within which both political and 
economic transitions could be accomplished – democracy became the bulwark against 
both forms of totalitarianism as well as the return to state managed economies. The 
concept, indeed ideology, of global governance has come to take account of all these 
strands. In the following sections I will reflect upon three of the four strands noted 
above: neo-liberalism and global governance, the ‘failing’ state and democratisation.  
 
 
Neo-liberalism and Global Governance 
Neo-liberal economic theory is the ascendant framework for global 
governance. The discourse of neo-liberalism, then emphasises, and indeed normalises, 
the “efficiency, welfare and the freedom of the market, and self-actualisation through 
the process of consumption” (Gill, 1995:401) even though the outcomes of these 
policies are contradictory, hierarchical and inefficient to protect human life and the 
world in which we live. This discourse of the market also has another message – if 
market based competition is the most efficient way of allocating resources in society, 
then any attempts to interfere in its functioning would be per se inimical to the 
‘greater good’. The dominant actors, in the context of globalisation, are those that 
control trans-national capital that is the motor behind much of economic activity – 
                                                          
4 Asked about the place of the US in the international system Secretary of State for Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld replied “I honestly believe that every country ought to do what it wants to do…It is either 
proud of it afterwards or it is less proud of itself” (The Guardian, 11.02.04: 25). Can global governance 
institutions constrain and contain the might of the US?  
5 A liberal reformulation of this position would be that global governance regime is needed for the 
provision of global public goods, such as a sustainable environment, as well as regulation of global 
public bads, such as international crime (Nayar and Court, 2002: vii). Neither a sustainable 
environment nor international crime, however, can be understood without reflecting upon the social 
contradictions that give rise to unsustainable environments and to the growth of international crime.  
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through the circulation of money, through speculation on money markets, and capital 
movements as well as through tax evasion and money laundering. The market then, 
though far from a level playing field, is given the primary political space in the 
discourse of globalisation.  
 
The market is institutionalised not only in the functioning of global capitalism 
but also through the institutions of global governance. This, to quote Gill, is done 
through the process of ‘new constitutionalism’ - in contrast to traditional 
constitutionalism that is associated with the state - which “can be defined as the 
political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal 
democratic capitalism the sole model for future development” (ibid.:412). It is in this 
project that institutions of global governance – the IMF, the World Bank and the 
WTO - become stronger vis as vis the state, that are presented as neutral players 
seeking maximum economic efficiency for all through attempting to ensure ‘fair 
dealing’ in the markets6
 
. These institutions also symbolise the separation of the 
economic from the political, thus taking the heat out of macro-economic policy 
making. Indeed, the very term governance emerges because the increasingly 
important Bretton Woods agencies are not mandated to challenge the primary position 
of state actors. Governance or indeed, ‘good governance’ then becomes a measure “to 
refer to the capacity of governments to formulate and implement policies and 
processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic 
and social resources.” (Faundez, 1997:6) Law is an important part of institutionalising 
neoliberalism:   (World Bank, 1992) through providing the following: “(a) … a set of 
rules known in advance; (b) [ensuring that] the rules are actually in force; (c) [that] 
there are mechanisms ensuring application of the rules; (d) [that] conflicts are decided 
through binding decisions of an independent body; and (e) there are procedures for 
amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose” (p. 30).  Rules, then, are 
critical to ‘good governance’ – rules that stabilise neoliberalism through state law, but 
which are disciplinary in the global sense.  
 Finally, market dominated, state sceptical governance also takes a privatising 
turn. Through internal regulatory mechanisms such as voluntary codes of conduct, 
transnational capital seeks to limit external scrutiny of its production regimes and the 
impact of these on labour and the environment in particular.  The stabilisation of these 
privatised forms of governance takes place through recognition by international 
organisations of these initiatives7. However, NGOs and social movements also play a 
part in challenging internal regulation by scrutinising both the parameters of the codes 
as well as mechanisms for the implementations (www.corpwatch.org). 
 
Gendered Markets  
If markets are crucial to the understanding of the current phase of globalisation 
- through the mechanisms of global production (labour) and exchange (goods and 
services), of regulation that spans not one country but regions and (with the increased 
                                                          
6 One could argue that this disciplinary neo-liberalism is clearly evident in the increasing convergence 
between the economic policy frameworks of the World Bank and the UNDP, especially in addressing 
the anti-poverty agenda as well as in initiatives for the management of capital-labour relations through 
the Global Social Compact, which builds on the idea of ‘corporate social responsibility’ – one way of 
privatising social governance.  
7 See for example the Global Social Compact negotiated by the UN under the leadership of Kofi Anan 
(www.globalsocialcompact.org) 
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role of international economic institutions, and the WTO) the globe, through the use 
of technologies that so enhance the flows of monies and make instantaneous financial 
transactions across the globe possible, through breaking down the political resistance 
of nation-states to liberalisation and opening up of their internal markets to global 
competition - then we need to analyse the gendered nature of markets as well as 
impact of the gendered roles for women. Feminists have argued that markets are 
socially embedded institutions and roles ‘within market systems are structured by 
non-market criteria’ and then institutionalised through indicators of ‘market 
rationality’8
 
 (Harriss-White, 1998:201; Elson and Pearson, 1998). These non-market, 
though clearly not non-economic, criteria lead to specific gender based distortions in 
the markets (see Palmer, 1991; van Staveren, 2000; Rai, 2002). The participants in the 
market include the state, market organisations such as formal associations such as 
trade unions, consumer groups, business associations, market networks, firms and 
individuals. The functioning of the market depends upon the politics of state 
involvement, the politics of market structures and the politics of social embeddedness 
- of the state and the market (White, 1993: 6-10). In such a patterned market system, 
participants come to specific markets with ‘unequal’ capabilities and bargaining 
capacities and resources as a result of and which inhere in unequal market structures, 
regulated and stabilised by gendered state formations, and characterised by more or 
less unequal power - class and gender are two bases for unequal power relations 
operating in the market. The consequence of this is that gendered market hierarchies 
distribute rewards and privileges (Palmer, 1991 ) and construct and consolidate 
identities (Ling, 1997) which then further embed markets in gendered socio-economic 
‘scapes’.   
The neo-liberal ideology thus fails to take into account the embedded nature of 
the markets and its consequences. It does not query that individuals can pursue their 
economic self-interests in ways that has nothing to do with the ‘best price’. Neither do 
they question the “degree to which self-interest places economic goals ahead of 
friendship, family ties, spiritual considerations, or morality.” (Block, 1990:54) Nor, 
indeed how reproductive roles might change in the playing out of market roles 
(Harriss-White, 1998). Finally, there is an assumption that instrumentality in decision 
making goes hand in hand with obedience to rules, and with maximising interests, 
rather than a set of signals that can lead to conflictual economic and social behaviour 
in different groups of populations. Together this brings into question the assumed 
neutrality of markets in terms of access, competitiveness and efficiency. 
 
In the current phase of globalisation, markets are not seen only as central to 
resource competition and allocation in the sphere of private capital, but also as central 
to state and governance institutions more generally. This has led critical theorists to 
speak of marketised institutions. As Hewson and Sinclair have put it, marketised 
institutions “may not be market institutions in the narrow sense. However, even 
within public institutions the tendency is increasingly towards adopting market 
principles of organization and social intervention” (1999:17). Philip McMichael 
suggests the same when he speaks of the ‘new manegerialism’ that promotes a 
problem solving approach to difficult issues of redistribution of resources (2000).     
In terms of the central concerns of regulatory regimes of global capitalism, and the 
role of global governance institutions in securing these regimes through TRIPS for 
                                                          
8 For a discussion of gendered market sectors and production processes see Elson, 1999; Elson and 
Pearson, 1998; Mies, 1982. 
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example, feminist arguments about the gendered nature of markets would make us re-
examine the whole basis of the TRIPS regime and not just the governance of the trade 
regimes in the context of the unequal power relations between the North and the 
South. Under TRIPS patents cover “any inventions, whether products or processes 
(our italics), in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application” (our italics).  Two things 
stand out here. First, that both product and processes have now been brought under 
the patenting regime. As a result, for example, farmers will not be able to keep seeds 
from their crops. As women form an increasing number of small and poor farmers, 
this provision is affecting them particularly. Second, patents privilege particular forms 
of knowledge – ‘stabilising’ historically developed processes of production would 
entitle modern industrial companies to patent products and processes and deny 
nature’s and people’s creativity. “By discounting time and historically evolving nature 
of innovation, patenting institutionalises privilege – those who are left out of the loop 
(very often poor women are the majority of those excluded) fall progressively behind 
in the race for ring-fencing products for monopoly exploitation” (Barwa and Rai, 
2003:). Vandana Shiva has been arguing that perhaps these insights should lead us 
towards exploring the merits of  ‘social patents’, thus broadening the 
acknowledgement of knowledge creation and to gain accessed to gendered markets. 
However, she also worries whether this would allow the principle of ‘knowledge as 
property’ to be further entrenched in discourses of governance (Shiva and Holla-Bhar, 
1996; Shiva, 2000).  If these insights of feminist and critical scholars and activists are 
taken into account, it becomes possible to assess the nature of global institutions as 
based on market principles, promoting market based solutions to social and political 
problems, and stabilising these solutions with the support of dominant epistemic elites 
(Taylor, 2000).  
 
 The Failing State? 
Because of the centring of the market that takes place through ‘disciplinary 
neoliberalism’, there is a great deal of interest in the changing nature of the state in 
the literature on global governance. Indeed one could argue that the whole edifice of 
global governance is built on assumptions about the shifting boundaries of the state in 
the international political economy on the one hand, and international relations on the 
other (Rosenau and Czempiel, 2000). The shifts in the nature and position of the state 
then beg the question about what replaces the state/government and the inter-state 
world system. Writers point to various concepts such as ‘transworld’ 
‘supraterritoriality’ and more narrowly, ‘multilateralism’ to describe the system of 
‘post-state’ political economy and international relations (Scholte, 2000). The global 
spread of capitalism demands attention to the relations between the nation-state and 
global markets on the one hand and the nation-state and the international system on 
the other (World Bank, 1992; 2002). In the 1980s, when neoliberalism was making its 
challenge to state-mediated social democracy, it was suggested that the state is no 
longer capable of addressing the issues arising from the global reach of capitalism, 
whether these are relating to competition in the market, regulation of the market or to 
maintaining rules within its borders in order to resolve the collective problems of its 
citizens (Strange, 1995). As such, the nature of competition between states in the 
international system, Strange argued, also changed - from competing over territory to 
competing over markets. And that as the form of competition between states has 
changed, so has their nature, with trade and finance policies becoming more important 
than defence and foreign policies.     
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This analysis of the ‘leaking sovereignty’ of the state is reflected in the 
discourse of the dysfunctional state that held sway in the 1980s and early 1990s in 
another context. The World Bank in its report on Governance and Development 
(1992) suggested that third world states were unable or unwilling to develop the 
capacity to formulate and implement policies for the development of the economy of 
the country. Economic conditionalities (generally known as structural adjustment 
policies) set by the Bank and the IMF were not working because of the failure of the 
state. A plethora of ‘good governance’ literature then flooded the development scene 
articulating, reflecting and assessing donors’ demands upon the recipient nation-states 
“for democratic pluralism, for the rule of law, for a less regulated economy and for a 
clean and non-corrupt administration...for greater decentralization...” (UNDP, 
1994:76). The globalisation of policy frameworks indicated the relative weakness of 
the state in the newly emerging international system. The state was, in line with the 
rhetoric of resurgent liberalism, the problem not the solution; the state hindered the 
expansion and functioning of markets that was a key to the stabilisation of the world 
economy. Too much government was stifling the energies of entrepreneurs waiting to 
take advantage of expanding markets. “Weak institutions – tangled laws, corrupt 
courts, deeply biased credit systems, and elaborate business registration requirements 
– hurt poor people and hinder development…” according to the World Development 
Report on Building Institutions for Markets  (2002: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/WDR2002). This does not seem like a weak state, but 
a dysfunctional one. The question then was whether the state could respond to the 
new pressures of global political economy and if so, what should be the parameters of 
its functioning?  
 
While many proclaimed the weaknesses of the state are leading to a post-
statist era, others reflected upon how the state is repositioning itself in order to secure 
its continued role in mediating between capital and labour in the period of 
globalisation. The argument was that capital needs the regulatory power of the state in 
order to do business, but that the state needs to be committed to economic 
liberalisation in order to fulfil the potential of globalising markets (Cox, 1996). What 
we are witnessing, argues Cox, is not the demise of the nation-state but its 
‘internationalisation’; not its destruction but its transformation. In brief, Cox argues 
that from being bulwarks against the global intrusions into national economies, 
today’s states are becoming mediators, adapters and negotiators with the global 
political economy. To perform this changed role they have to reconfigure the power 
structures of government, giving far more emphasis to the role of finance and trade in 
economic regulation rather than industry and labour, for example. The state’s role, 
therefore, becomes one of helping to adjust the domestic economy to the requirements 
of the world economy (1996). In this context the nostalgia for a benign, or at the very 
least powerless, nation-state is clearly misplaced: “[n]ational states exist as political 
‘nodes’ or ‘moments’ in the global flow of capital” and that their development is part 
of the crisis-ridden development of capitalist society (Burnham 1998:8).  And 
furthermore, that this aspect of the internationalisation of the state points to the 
current contradictions in globalisation as to extract surplus globally, capital depends 
on national and global public goods provision while at the same time reducing the 
capacity of states to generate tax revenue, and by putting them under the discipline of 
neoliberalism through structural adjustment policies, to provide those ‘public goods’.  
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Feminist Engagement with the State  
If a critique of markets have focused feminist attention to the contexts within 
which global governance institutions are regulating social relations, feminist 
approaches to global governance institutions have developed largely through analyses 
of political engagements at the level of the state9 (local as well as national).  Feminists 
have addressed the fundamental question whether the state is constitutive of gender 
relations by stabilizing patriarchy through discursive, legal and economic power. State 
economic policies in particular have been addressed in the context of production and 
primitive accumulation – the states’ ‘race to the bottom’ to attract private capital and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and under pressure from the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as IMF and the World Bank. As global capital’s presence is 
felt directly, less mediated through the state, and as local spaces are opened up to the 
forces of market the challenges to global economic forces and organisations are also 
posing issues of political discourse and mobilisation for women. Women’s labour, 
labour rights and the increasing burden of women in the context of privatisation and 
marketisation of social reproduction (Bakker and Gill, 2003) is analysed in feminist 
development literature (Kabeer, 1994; Elson, 1995; Rai, 2002; Beneria, 2003). Finally 
the discrepancy between the state’s role in regulating flows of capital and of labour 
(human beings) through a combination of nationalist, and even xenophobic, discourse 
around ‘illegal’ immigration as well through laws and policing have been studied by 
feminist sociologists and geographers (Kofman, this volume; Sassen; 1998 Truong, 
2003)10
 
.  
These analyses have led women’s groups and feminist activists to ask whether 
any engagement with the state, and building on this, with institutions of global 
governance is potentially fraught with dangers of co-option, or whether it is through 
critical engagements that feminists can change sate policy. Through the nineteen 
nineties, there was a decisive shift from scepticism and caution towards the state to an 
engagement with and embrace of state institutions. They did so in three broad arenas. 
The first is that of participation in political institutions. They have insisted upon the 
importance on representation of women in these institutions from different 
standpoints – that women do politics differently/better, or that it is just that 
historically excluded groups be allowed a say in the ‘governing’ that affects their 
lives. Strategizing for this, feminists have argued for quotas for women in political 
institutions in order to make women more visible and audible in political processes. 
They have also engaged with political institutions by participating in bureaucracies, 
policy making bodies and representative organisations under the broad principles of 
gender mainstreaming (Miller and Razavi, 1998; McBride Stetson and Mazur, 1995; 
Rai, 2003). The second arena, which links the state debate with that on 
democratisation, is that of women organising in the informal and formal sectors and 
                                                          
9 The state is broadly defined within the feminist literature to encompass formal politico-juridical 
institutions, regulatory frameworks such as constitutions and regulators as well as elements of 
discursive power such as educational and cultural bodies that privilege and consolidate, among others, 
gendered identities. Feminists from a poststructuralist position have emphasised the fractured nature of 
the state and hence the need to engage in the political interstices of the political system, while Marxist 
feminists have seen the gendered state as an important node in the maintenance of the global circuits of 
capital. State interests, thus, are cast in different light by different feminist scholars within a broad 
framework that gives credence to the specific gendered nature of the state.  
10 See Young 2003 for an analysis of the regulation of the movement of natural persons at the under 
Mode 4 of GATS.    
 8 
spaces of politics – women’s movements, human rights groups, functional lobbying 
groups such as the Self-employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and WIEGO. These 
groups have lobbied governance institutions at all levels from the outside. The focus 
has been both, the protection of their members as well as lobbying for shifts in state 
policy. Women’s movements have been grappling with the issue of the changing role 
of the state. As the sites of production and reproduction shift within states, as new 
regimes of production make for different forms of work - part-time, flexible, 
concentrated in EPZs, migratory - women are having to organise differently. While 
the state continues to be a central focus of women’s mobilisation on various issues, 
supra-territorial strategies are being increasingly employed in order to either counter 
the state, to delegitimise its position, or to mobilise global discursive regimes in their 
interests. So, women’s groups have participated in ethical trading initiatives (Hale, 
this volume), as well as challenged the erosion of welfare provision and pressed for 
gender sensitising economic policies at the global as well as the local level (O’Brien 
et.al., 2000). The third area of feminist intervention is that of developing political and 
epistemic networks that feed into policy institutions as well as debates. Feminist 
scholarship in the fields of Economics as well as Development Studies have unpacked 
key economic concepts, particularly the crucial concept of work - what constitutes 
work, how is it reflected in economic documents that form the basis of policy making 
and how, alternatively, might work be assessed, analysed and reflected in public 
debates (Rubery, 1988; Bakker, 1994; Bakker and Gill, 2003)? Gender budget groups 
in many countries have done useful work in dis-covering the male bias in economic 
accounting for the work of women and the impact of this bias on economic policy 
making and its impact on the lives of both men and women (Elson, in this volume). 
These groups have engaged in discussions with Treasury Departments with 
intellectual expertise and political commitment to attempt to make transparent the 
contribution of women to the economy.  
 
If the state is a participant in the reconstitution of its own relations with the 
global political economy, then it continues to be a focus for the struggles against this 
changing relation - whether it is from (dis-)organised labour in the urban or the rural 
context, or whether it is from other social movements. The nation-state as the focus of 
developmental struggles allows historical knowledges of traditions, cultures, and 
political contexts to be mobilised with greater facility than the amorphous 
‘international economic institutions’ peopled by shadowy figures not visible to the 
local oppositional struggles. Thus, state accountability and the space for political 
participation for both men and women forms an important part of the understanding 
of governance for many women’s groups at both the national and the global levels 
(Tambiah, 2002).  
 
 
Democratisation the State  
An analysis of the state gave impetus to the discourse of democratisation in 
the debates on the shift from government to governance.  While popular struggles had 
formed a critical part of the process of democratisation, the emphasis within the 
discourse remained on the link between liberalisation of economies and the 
democratisation of the state. This allowed democratisation to seen as a rather 
ahistorical unfolding of established western ‘models’ of democracy.  Economic 
conditionalities of the nineteen eighties were in the nineties supplemented by the 
political conditionalities of ‘good governance’. However, a critical literature on 
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democratisation did challenge these assumptions (Luckham and White, 1996; 
Whitehead, 2002). This literature paid attention to the mulit-level analysis of the 
international system on the one hand and the state and civil society relations on the 
other, which was to become a hallmark of the governance debate. Rueschemyer et.al. 
(1992) pointed to three factors that affect the actual working of democracies - 1) the 
international factors - such as inter-state relations; 2) the individual state itself and its 
political institutions and leadership - the role of the military as opposed to civilian 
leadership for example and 3) 'civil society' which reflects the social and interests 
groups with a stake in society. It was argued that it is the constellation of these three 
factors that make for the possibilities, or otherwise, of a successful democratisation 
process.  
 
The rise of global institutions led to a liberal institutionalist analysis of the 
consequences of global governance for democratisation. On the one hand, the various 
interventions focus on the need for conceptualising alternatives to state institutions of 
government in the context of the global political economy. On the other hand, the 
literature focuses on addressing the democratic deficit of the global institutions 
themselves. How can these institutions be made more accountable in a context where 
they seem to be usurping the power of the state (Woods, 2002)? The effectiveness of 
global institutions, especially the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions, are 
evaluated and found wanting leading to prescriptions of reform. New governance 
institutions are recommended to regulate actors and issues emerging as key in a 
globalised world, such as mechanisms of consultation, surveillance and co-ordination 
of macroeconomic policies, an ‘international financial architecture’ stabilised through 
global institutions, and the regulation of capital (TNCs) and labour (migration) (Nayar 
and Court, 2002: vii-xi). The democratic deficit in old international institutions is 
identified as a reason for attempting to reform the global governance regime.  
A juxtaposition of this liberal institutionalist agenda for global governance and of the 
social democratic framework might allow us to develop some key themes of 
democratic governance such as the link between political democracy and social 
justice, the relation between representative and participatory politics and the 
importance of global democratic space for mobilisation in challenging the hegemony 
of neoliberalism. Such a juxtaposition would also allow us to explore the concerns of 
feminist scholarship - about democratising the private as well as public spheres, the 
unbundling of citizenship in the context of neoliberal policy agendas and the struggles 
to defend the welfare state provisions and the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in 
policy making - which are sidelined in the liberal institutionalist framework. Feminist 
studies of transitional and democratising states emphasise these points. While some of 
the studies have focused on the impact of liberalising economies and the 
marketisation of the state on women’s lives (Einhorn, 2000) others have considered 
how women can engage the state in a globalising context where the state is coming 
under multiple pressures and is repositioning itself in different ways in different 
contexts (Rai, 2000 and 2002; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998;  Eschle, 2000, and 
Blacklock and Macdonald, 2000).  
 
  
Gendered global governance 
Feminist engagements with global governance have built upon the insights 
derived from the debates on the market and the state as well as on processes of 
democratisation. Meyer and Prugl have defined three different feminist approaches to 
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global governance. First, gender in global governance is seen as “involving 
institutional structures in which women have found or carved out niches for 
themselves and their interests as women” and therefore “introduce into global 
governance women-centred ways of framing issues…” (1999:4-5; Stienstra, 2000; 
Liebowitz, 2002). Gender mainstreaming processes have seen feminist bureaucrats 
and gender policy advocates make home in state and global governance structures. 
(Sawer, 2003; Staudt, 2003; Miller and Razavi, 1998). The outcomes of these 
engagements from within have varied greatly depending upon the level of 
bureaucratic hierarchy at which feminists are able to operate, the political culture of 
the site of governance, the dominant framework of analyses used by organisations to 
fashion policy, the resources that gender work has been able to attract – both financial 
and political capital – as well as the support that feminists within organisations have 
been able to depend upon from social movements engaged in advancing women’s 
strategic interests.  
 
Second, gender in global governance is approached through critical politics 
“exploring the purposive, goal-oriented…social-movement strategies to influence the 
United Nations…” and Bretton Woods institutions (p. 5; also see O’Brien et.al., 
2000). UN conferences have been catalysts for women’s organisations to mobilise in 
the interests of their constituents, as well as to develop conceptual tools to critically 
engage with the discourses of growth-led development emanating from Bretton 
Woods institutions. NGOs have mounted campaigns, such as Women’s Eyes on the 
Bank, and ‘Women Take on the World Trade Organisation’ campaign by Women’s 
Enviroment and Development Organization (WEDO). In the context of the regional 
free trade agreements, such as NAFTA, “Transnational NGO activism can actually be 
seen as contributing to or expanding the resources an national political movement has 
at its disposal” (Liebowitz, 2002: 175) thus linking the various levels of organisations 
and sites of resistance. Feminist and women’s groups have engaged with institutions 
at all these levels through conventional and virtual forms of political engagement and 
developed insights from these engagements (Eisenstein, 1998, also Youngs, 2001).  
 
Finally, feminists have approached gender politics in the context of global 
governance as “contestations of rules and discursive practices in different issue areas” 
(Meyer and Prugl, 1999:5). They have done so by not only focusing on the 
consequences of the dominant global neo-liberal economic policy frameworks 
espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions, but also the constitutive gendered nature 
of the concepts used to formulate these policies (Elson, 1995, Bakker, 1994; Rai, 
2003). Some have argued, for instance, that the intensification of globalisation 
through the extension of marketised economies and state institutions, feminist would 
suggest, has been accompanied by changes in the governance of production and social 
reproduction. This is resulting in the transformation of “gender orders and regimes 
associated with intensified globalization” and the institutionalisation of these 
transformations in gendered governance frameworks (Young, 2003: 109). 
 
While such a multi-level analysis of governance is useful, it is also important 
not see these levels are discrete, but as overlaid and overlapping. So, for example, 
local NGOs are often dependent upon state funding and/or external finance raising 
issues of accountability and transparency in agenda setting. Similarly, discourses of 
governance generated at the global levels, in part through women’s movements at 
local and national levels - through UN conferences for example - create a framework 
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for institutional initiatives at the state level. While state interests – generated through 
nationalist and/or democratic elites and articulated at international fora to convey 
particular political positions within the world system – also create discursive and 
policy frameworks on gender equity which women’s groups and movements can take 
advantage of11
 
. And finally, social movements continue to be imbricated at all levels. 
Women’s movements and environment and human rights movements working 
together would be some of the example here. Pulling these three strands together we 
find an alternative understanding of global governance, which focus on macro-level 
changes taking place in the international system and political economy, but grounds 
these in the local and global struggles on issues of political rights, language, and 
regimes of accumulation and exchange. 
Because of this grounding of theorising in political practice, feminists have 
been aware of issues of difference not only between men and women, but also among 
women. The differences that have emerged among women have been many - between 
NGOs of the North and those of the South, between activists and femocrats, between 
those who decide to engage with multilateral and state institutions and those who 
don’t, between those who are funded by multilateral agencies and those that are less 
well funded or not at all. These divisions are also about the implicated nature of 
engagement, which normalises critiques through mainstreaming them. As I have 
argued elsewhere (2002), NGOs and women’s movements working with institutions 
of power at any level are constrained by the dominant paradigms of power. Most of 
the initiatives taken by these institutions under pressure from women’s groups are 
‘integrating’ rather than ‘agenda-setting’ (Jahan1995).  The limitations of ‘cultural’ 
and ‘socio-economic’ structures that embed the political institutions are significant 
constraints upon women activists. This emphasis on difference has also led to the 
worry that the terms of women’s engagements with multilateral bodies or state 
institutions do not generally favour women. The shifts in the paradigms within which 
various institutions of power function are minimal and hence, for example, 
institutions such as the national machineries for the advancement of women work 
within very narrow boundaries, reluctant or unable to challenge the dominant socio-
political power. Finally, feminists have considered the question of the legitimacy of 
not only global institutions, but also of women’s NGO’s speaking for women at 
international and national fora. Who can speak of the pain and confusion of activists 
on the ground who feel betrayed by the system that they thought was going to be their 
ally for change? (Rai, 2002) Thus, feminist insights gained through political practice 
allow us to ask different questions about the parameters and paradigms of governance 
(Peterson, 2003). Who is being governed, in whose interests and how – traditional 
issues of political science are disturbed through the introduction of the categories of 
gender.   
 
 
 The Politics of Global Governance 
I have suggested above that as a concept, global governance becomes 
prominent in the context of disciplinary neo-liberalism and can be seen to be 
institutionalising the neo-liberal framework at the level of macro-economic policy. In 
                                                          
11 I am grateful to one anonymous referee for bringing this point to my notice. The way in which 
‘western’ commitment to gender equality was raised as an issue by the US state in the context of the 
invasion of Afghanistan, but disregarded in the case of Iraq poses interesting questions for feminist 
scholarship and activism.  
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his critique of the work of the Commission on Global Governance, Baxi comments on 
the discrepancy between the assumptions of globality by the Commission and the 
“central facts of contemporary world disorder” (1996: 530). Violence and poverty in 
particular are growing apace, and both affect women in particular ways. The 
feminisation of poverty, and violence against women in creating and policing new and 
old inter-state borders has made this co-operative development a fraught discourse for 
women. In this context Baxi rightly comments that “If governance is to be conceived 
as a process, it is well to recall that process is permeated by structures-in-dominance, 
both in states and civil societies.” (p. 532) The contradictions that arise out of 
capitalism’s march across the globe are embedded in social relations of inequalities 
based on class, gender, ethnicities and religions among others. The assessment of the 
processes and institutions of governance need to be aware of these contradictions and 
the power relations that frame them.  
 
Democratising Global Governance 
If the growing salience of global institutions is an important characteristic of 
the world we live in, then the question also arises about the nature of these institutions 
(Woods, 2002). This question can be addressed in two different ways. The first 
approach would be to address the ways in which these institutions are participating in 
a process of embedding ‘structures-in-dominance’ (Baxi, 1996) such that capitalist 
regimes of production and exchange are taken to be the only way forward for the 
global economy. Global convergence, in this sense, can be seen to be the stretching 
out the borders of capitalism to encompass the world. In this sense, global institutions 
become the target of opposition movements and civil society groups. The anti-
capitalist movements broadly defined thus are not interested in necessarily holding 
these institutions accountable. Rather their purpose is to challenge the policy agendas 
of these institutions and also to ‘reveal’ these institutions as embedded in the 
dominant capitalist order and therefore participating in establishing a ‘disciplinary 
neoliberalism’ (Gill, 1995) which increasingly binds states and non-state actors into 
the global capitalist system. This analysis of global institutions then leads us to 
consider political strategies that are focused on increasing the space for peoples’ 
movements, challenge the erosion of the provision of public goods and to envision 
alternative modes of governance for a different globalisation.  
 
Alternatively, and developing the liberal institutionalist analysis, there is a 
growing concern with the democratic deficit that is attached to global governance. As 
Held argues, under globalisation, “where transnational actors and forces cut across the 
boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, where powerful international 
organizations and agencies make decisions for vast groups of people across diverse 
borders, and where the capacities of large companies can dwarf many a state, the 
questions of who should be accountable to whom, and on what basis, do not easily 
resolve themselves” (2002:308). The focus of analysis then becomes the issue of 
democratic accountability, transparency and legitimacy of global institutions. Liberal 
cosmopolitanism is one response to these issues. Upon this reading, laws and 
constitutions must reflect egalitarian individualism. Impartial reasoning and the 
avoidance of serious harm are the two underlying principles of that are reflected in 
cosmopolitan responses to the challenges of democratising global governance. 
Archibugi defines cosmopolitical democracy in the following way: “Cosmopolitical 
democracy is based on the assumption that important objectives – control of the use of 
force, respect for human rights, self-determination – will be obtained only through the 
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extension and development of democracy”(Archibugi, 2000:143). It builds on the 
assumption that issues such as the environment, migration and use of natural 
resources are no longer contained within national boundaries, that technology allows 
communicative networks to be globalised and therefore democratic politics to become 
possible including the re-envisioning of non-coercive international institutions 
without disappearing the national states. A world parliament is suggested as is the 
extension of world assemblies, which are representatives not of the states but of the 
people. Critics have, however, pointed out the naivete and indeed the danger of such 
cosmopolitan envisionings: socially structured spaces of world politics do not, 
Chandler argues, allow for sovereign equality among states. The hegemonic power of 
some (particularly the US) states is evidence of the embeddedness of dominant 
discursive agency of some in the face of diminishing autonomy of others (Chandler, 
2000). This cautionary stance provokes me to suggest that if feminist engagements 
with global governance institutions do not take into account the disciplinary power of 
the dominant social relations within which these institutions are embedded, these 
engagements could succumb to the danger of supporting “systems that create 
themselves” (Riles, 2000:173). While I see the expanded confidence of feminist 
movements and networks, I also worry that the spaces for negotiations and 
deliberations leading to radical redistributive outcomes decreasing. The seduction of 
engagement with governance institutions and influencing policy outcomes which 
provides a sense of agency against all odds, at times through emphasising the process 
over outcome, at others through emphasising ‘empowerment’ without the transfer of 
resources that denotes changes in power relations also provide cautionary tales.  
 
 
Challenges for Feminist Politics  
 The challenges that feminist politics faces are both in the arenas of scholarship 
and activism. While feminists have posited a powerful critique to mainstream global 
governance literature, they also need to present an alternative articulation of what 
governance means (Pearson in this volume). If they do not like marketised 
institutions, they need to be able to sketch the outline of governance institutions that 
they would like to see. Catherine Hoskyns and I (1998) have argued that “[f]or both 
strategic as well as practical reasons women have had to organize separately as 
women. ..[However, the] feminist challenge is limited by a current lack of focus on 
the importance of redistributive policies that are rooted in the structural inequalities of 
capitalist production and exchange“ (p. 362). We posed the question: can gender 
recover class? Following Spivak, I would argue that a recognition of the importance 
of redistribution allows us  “[b]oth in the economic area (capitalist) and in the 
political (world-historical agent) ... to construct models of a divided and dislocated 
subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other” (ibid. 276) And 
these dislocations, and discontinuities are where women seeking transformation 
within political economy as well as the discursive circuits of power can find agency. 
This is particularly relevant now when marketisation and the retrenchment of welfare 
provision under globalisation is creating tremendous pressures and inequalities across 
different social and spatial boundaries. We see, however, that feminists are engaging 
with institutions within the convergent ideological framework of neo-liberal 
governance because the space for alternatives has scaled down even as the recognition 
of gender based inequalities has increased. This is not to suggest that these 
engagements are not important. Indeed the solid ground of embedded liberalism has 
fractured so much under the neo-liberal onslaught that the protection of the welfare 
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state seems a radical project well worth participating in. However, a recognition of the 
limits of the strategies of engagement with ‘constitutional neoliberalism’ also need to 
be taken seriously if we are to be effective in developing political strategies of 
empowerment for both poor women and men.  
 
Conclusion 
One could argue that global governance is a concept that hides as much as it reveals. 
On the one hand the shift from government to governance is presented as an 
explanatory framework seeking to account for global change, and on the other it is 
seen as addressing the problem of states’ inability to respond to that change. 
However, the power of hegemonic intellectual and policy elites are behind it and as 
such it has also become central to the alternative discourses of counter-hegemonic 
movements. Feminists too are engaged in this debate as they see a “general 
broadening of the field of international reorganisation from a preoccupation with 
describing the output of intergovernmental organisations, their formal attributes and 
processes of decision-making to a concern with structures of governance” (Meyer and 
Prugl, 1999: 4). These structures include organisations such as the UN, and NGOs as 
well as social and political movements in a ‘global civil society’.  A concern with 
issues of governance also helps explode the myth of consent that is a feature of the 
earlier globalisation literature – a consent that is often juxtaposed with the 
inevitability of globalisation and therefore conceals the power relations within which 
the process is developing. One could argue as Palan does, that “the language of global 
governance, with its attendant rather unflattering insinuations about the functions, 
legitimacy, and aptitude of the state (and society)...makes sense only once an 
agreement is reached about some prior, if normally undeclared, common human 
goals, political functions and so on.” (1999:67) These a priori notions are themselves 
markers of closures - not the same as operated under nationalist regimes, but new 
closures which make for new winners and losers - in both the public and the private 
spheres, and take both national and local/global forms.  
 
I have argued in this article that issues of gender have particular salience in the 
debates on governance and unless we use the insights that have emerged from 
feminist theory and practice we will not be able to encompass the needs of the future 
in the conversations about the global present. To reiterate, feminist contributions to 
these conversations lie in ways in which political activism and theoretical insights 
have been methodologically imbricated to develop insights on governance. These 
insights have examined the discursive as well as the material power wielded in 
embedding certain dominant explanations of governance in the mainstream literature 
which have then shaped the agendas for ‘governing’ (Kooiman, 2003) and paradigms 
of governance. Specifically, feminist interventions in the areas of knowledge creation, 
recognition and institutionalisation have particular salience for the processes of 
embedding neo-liberal marketised discourses of globalisation and governance. 
Feminist debates on the state and democracy have relevance for the way in which 
political activism as well as the relational understanding between the state and global 
institutions of governance might be viewed. Gendered critiques of markets as not only 
uneven spaces of exchange, but as inefficient and distorted mechanisms that build 
upon unequal gendered social relations subject the normalisation of rationality of the 
market to rigorous scrutiny. The global governance debate needs to make a 
conceptual shift to embed these insights, developed through everyday struggle at 
local, state and global levels, as well as through engagements with and critiques of 
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mainstream literature if theories of critical governance are to fundamentally challenge 
the structures-in-dominance within this field.  
 
Specifically, I would suggest three areas where feminist deconstruction of the 
concept provide radical insights into the concept. First, such an analysis becomes an 
exercise in the recognition of the multiple bases of inequalities that are being 
stabilised through systems of global governance: class, North/South relations and 
gender as the unequal social relations constitutive of global capitalism which find 
reflection in marketised institutions. Second, it allows us to reflect upon gendered 
arguments and political strategies that challenge these inequalities. From gender 
mainstreaming to gender budgets, from gendered Codes of Conduct to gendering 
workers’ unions, from enhancing the scope of micro-credit to the extension of Tobin 
Tax to Maria Tax (Pearson, this volume). Finally, While these multiple strategies are 
critical to addressing gendered inequalities, the focus on the study of how global 
capitalism is embedded in socially unequal regimes of production and social 
reproduction also allows us to view the limits of these strategies. However important 
to the lives of individual men and women shifts in specific policies cannot offset the 
disciplinary dominance of global capitalist relations. To challenge that a broader 
alliance of feminist form part, would be needed. As Hoskyns and I have argued, “the 
next phase of women’s struggles needs to take on board more centrally the issue of 
redistribution of resources if power relations in society are to be refashioned“ 
(Hoskyns and Rai, 1998:363)12
                                                          
12 As Upen Baxi pointed out in his reading of this paper, the society we speak of is already globalised 
and therefore the epistemic and social struggles that feminists have to engage in are also necessarily 
globalised not only in the targets of the struggle – a transnationalist capitalist class that dominates 
through both state and suprastate institutions – but also the networks of struggle that they create.  
. Perhaps the next phase of women’s struggles might 
be stronger for building bridges with other movements arising from the continuing 
marginalisation of people living under intensification of globalisation.    
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